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he 1990s have seen unprecedented growth in
mutual funds. Shares in the funds now repre-
sent a major part of household wealth, and
the funds themselves have become important
intermediaries for savings and investments. In the
United States, more than 4,000 mutual funds cur-
rently hold stocks and bonds worth a total of more
than $2 trillion (Chart 1). Household investment in
these funds increased more than fivefold in the last ten
years, making it the fastest growing item on the
household financial balance sheet. Most of this growth
came at the expense of more traditional forms of savings,
particularly bank deposits.
With the increased popularity of mutual funds
come increased concerns—namely, could a sharp drop
in stock or bond prices set off a cascade of redemptions by
fund investors and could the redemptions exert further
downward pressure on asset markets? In recent years,
flows into funds have generally been highly correlated
with market returns. That is, mutual fund inflows
have tended to accompany market upturns and out-
flows have tended to accompany downturns. This cor-
relation raises the question whether a positive-
feedback process is at work here, in which market
returns cause the flows at the same time that the flows
cause the returns. Observers such as Hale (1994) and
Kaufman (1994) fear that such a process could turn a
decline in the stock or bond market into a downward
spiral in asset prices.1 
In this study, we use recent historical evidence to
explore one dimension of the broad relationship between
market returns and mutual fund flows: the effect of short-
term market returns on mutual fund flows. Research on
this issue has already confirmed high correlations between
market returns and aggregate mutual fund flows (Warther
1995). A positive-feedback process, however, requires not
just correlation but two-way causation between flows and
returns, in which fund investors react to market move-
ments while the market itself moves in response to the
investors’ behavior. 
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Source:  Investment Company Institute.






















Previous studies of causation have focused on the
effects of past performance on flows into individual mutual
funds, typically with a one-year lag separating cause and
effect. In this article, however, we examine the effect of
market-wide returns on aggregate mutual fund flows
within a month, a level of aggregation and a time horizon
that seem more consistent with the dynamics of a
downward spiral in asset prices. Our statistical analysis
uses instrumental variables, a technique that is partic-
ularly well suited for measuring causation when
observed variables are likely to be determined simulta-
neously. The technique has not been applied before to
mutual fund flows and market returns.
Despite market observers’ fears of a downward
spiral, our study suggests that the short-term effect of
market returns on mutual fund flows typically has been
too weak to sustain a spiral. During unusually severe
market declines, stock and bond movements have
prompted proportionately greater outflows than under
normal conditions, but even at these times, the effect
has not seemed strong enough to perpetuate a sharp fall
in asset prices. 
We begin by describing the nature of mutual
funds and characterizing their recent growth. Next, we
examine the data on aggregate mutual fund flows by
dividing them into expected and unexpected components and
investigating their correlations with market returns.
The effects of returns on flows are then estimated
using instrumental variables. Finally, we test the
robustness of our estimates by looking at the flows
during severe market declines. 
THE NATURE AND GROWTH 
OF MUTUAL FUNDS
Mutual funds operate as tax-exempt financial institutions
that pool resources from numerous shareholders to invest
in a diversified portfolio of securities.2 Unlike closed-end
funds, which issue a fixed number of shares, open-end
mutual funds are obligated to redeem shares at the
request of the shareholder. When a shareholder redeems
shares, he or she receives their net asset value, which
equals the value of the fund’s net assets divided by the
number of shares outstanding. An investment manager
determines the composition of the fund’s investment
portfolio in accordance with the fund’s return objectives
and risk criteria.
INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES AND FEE STRUCTURES
Mutual funds vary widely in their investment objectives.
The Investment Company Institute (ICI)—the industry
trade group whose membership includes almost all regis-
tered U.S. mutual funds—classifies mutual funds according
to twenty-one investment objectives (Appendix A). For
instance, some funds aim to provide a steady stream of
income while others emphasize capital appreciation; some
funds specialize in U.S. common stocks while others
specialize in U.S. bonds or in foreign stocks and bonds. It is
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important to gauge a fund’s performance relative to its
investment objective because the different objectives repre-
sent trade-offs between risk and return. Some objectives
aim for high returns at high risk, others for more modest
returns but at less risk.
Mutual funds also differ in their fee structures,
which can affect the sensitivity of flows to a fund’s short-
term performance. Many mutual funds charge an up-front
sales fee, called a load, that is typically around 5 percent of
the initial investment. The desire to spread the cost of the
load over time may make a shareholder reluctant to sell in
the short run. For example, Ippolito (1992) finds that poor
performance leads to half as many withdrawals from load
funds as from no-load funds. Chordia (1996) also provides
evidence that such fees discourage redemptions. At the end
of 1995, 62 percent of the assets in stock mutual funds and
66 percent of the assets in bond mutual funds were in load
funds.3 Although no-load funds impose no up-front fees,
many collect back-end fees, called contingent deferred sales
charges, when shares are redeemed. These fees generally
decline the longer the shares are held and thus also discour-
age investors from selling in the short run.
THE GROWTH OF MUTUAL FUNDS
Although mutual funds have existed in the United States
since 1924, truly significant amounts of money did not
start flowing into the funds until the mid-1980s. A decline
in deposit rates in the early 1990s marked the beginning of
explosive growth in the funds. As a result, mutual funds as
a group have become important financial intermediaries
and repositories of household wealth. Households in 1995
held 10 percent of their net financial wealth in mutual
fund shares directly and 3 percent indirectly through
pension funds (Table 1). At the end of 1995, the net assets
of mutual funds were 60 percent as large as the assets held
by commercial banks, a leap from only 27 percent at
year-end 1986 (Table 2). Such rapid growth has prompted
Hale (1994) to suggest that the rise of mutual funds is
creating a whole new financial system.
 Much of the growth in mutual funds can be
attributed to the influx of retirement money driven by
long-term demographic forces. Morgan (1994) shows that
changes in the share of household assets held in stocks and
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds
Accounts.
Table 1
MAJOR HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL ASSETS
Billions of Dollars
Asset Type   1986 1995
Deposits (check, time, savings) 2,650 3,258
Pension reserves 2,265 5,510
Life insurance 264 542
Money market shares 229 452
Total securities, 2,497 7,436
of which:
Corporate equities 1,453 4,313
Mutual funds 334 1,265
Memo:
Mutual fund assets as a percentage 
    of total securities 13 17
Mutual fund assets as a percentage 
    of net financial wealth 7 10
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds
Accounts.
Note:  Mutual funds include short-term funds.
Table 2















Commercial banks 2,620 32 4,501 28
Thrift institutions 1,539 19 1,326 8
Insurance companies 1,260 15 2,832 18
Pension plans 1,723 21 4,014 25
Finance companies 421 5 827 5
Mutual funds 717 9 2,598 16
TOTAL 8,280 100 16,097 100
Mutual funds vary widely in their investment 
objectives. . . . It is important to gauge a fund’s 
performance relative to its investment objective 
because the different objectives represent
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Sources of Flows: Holders of Stock and Bond Mutual Funds
Chart 2















































bonds are explained by the proportion of workers thirty-
five years of age or older. Workers reaching thirty-five
years of age tend to earn enough to start saving for retire-
ment, and mutual fund shares represent a way to invest
their savings. Households also save through retirement
plans, life insurance policies, and trust accounts with
banks. Among these investments, retirement plans
have been acquiring mutual fund shares at the highest
rate: the share of mutual fund assets held by retirement
plans expanded from 6.2 percent in 1986 to 16.4 per-
cent in 1995 (Chart 2). Life-cycle motives for investing
in mutual funds—such as saving for retirement—can
make certain flows insensitive to short-term returns,
and much of these flows would be predictable on the
basis of past flows. Hence, this analysis will distin-
guish between long-term trends and short-term fluctu-
ations in mutual fund flows.
As large as the recent flows have been, mutual funds
still hold relatively small shares of the markets in which
they invest. At the end of 1995, they held 16 percent of the
capitalization of the municipal bond market, 12 percent of
the corporate equity market, 7 percent of the corporate
and foreign bond market, and 5 percent of the U.S.
Treasury and agency securities market (Chart 3). These
fairly small shares limit the potential impact of the
flows on asset prices. Estimates by Shleifer (1986) sug-
gest that an exogenous decline in mutual funds’
demand for stocks by one dollar would reduce the
value of the market by one dollar. Such estimates
imply that selling pressure by mutual funds alone is
unlikely to cause a sharp market decline.
As large as the recent flows have been, 
mutual funds still hold relatively small 
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Share of Securities Held by Mutual Funds, 1995
Chart 3






























Monthly Flows into Stock and Bond Mutual Funds
Chart 4
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THE CORRELATION BETWEEN RETURNS 
AND FLOWS 
The recent movements of large mutual fund flows suggest
a strong correlation between market returns and the flows.
In the early 1990s, the flows into stock and bond mutual
funds were equally strong (Chart 4). However, when the
Federal Reserve started to raise its target federal funds rate
in February 1994, the bond market became bearish and the
flows shifted sharply from bond to stock funds. More
recently, the equity bull market in 1995 was accompanied
by record flows into stock funds. Such correlations between
aggregate fund flows and marketwide returns suggest a
positive-feedback process in which the market returns
cause the fund flows at the same time that the flows cause
the returns.
For our analysis, it is important to distinguish
among various notions of correlations between flows and
returns. For instance, Warther (1995) has documented
strong correlations between monthly market returns and
monthly aggregate mutual fund flows. The question then
arises, Do such monthly correlations reflect causation
between returns and flows? If they do, could they lead to a
strong positive-feedback process? Note that the correla-
tions that Kaufman (1994) and Hale (1994) have in mind
may be quite different. Kaufman, for example, emphasizes
that the average investor in mutual funds has never experi-
enced a prolonged bear market. In such a market, investors
may suddenly react by redeeming their shares heavily.4 The
correlation would therefore be between returns over an
unspecified period and flows over a somewhat shorter
period. Our analysis examines only monthly flow-return
correlations from 1986 to 1996, a period for which there
may not have been a bear market of long enough duration
to test Kaufman’s hypothesis.38 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997
MEASURING MUTUAL FUND FLOWS
To measure mutual fund flows, we use monthly ICI data
on cash flows into and out of mutual funds from July
1986 to April 1996.5 In the ICI data, cash flows are
computed for each of the twenty-one groupings of funds
by investment objective. Within each group, cash flows
are further broken down into total sales, redemptions,
exchange sales, and exchange redemptions. Total sales
and redemptions represent outside flows, while
exchange sales and exchange redemptions represent
flows between funds within a fund family. We compute
net flows as total sales minus redemptions, plus
exchange sales minus exchange redemptions.
We make several adjustments to the mutual fund
categories by either aggregating categories or excluding
some from our study. We exclude money market mutual
funds and precious metal funds because they do not
seem to be subject to the same risks as stock and bond
funds. We also exclude various hybrid funds (flexible
portfolio, income mixed, balanced, and income bond)
because of the lack of an appropriate market price index.
We combine aggressive growth and growth stock funds,
income and growth-and-income stock funds, and global
and international stock funds. Hence, we collapse six
equity categories into three: growth, income, and global
stock funds. We also combine long-term municipal
bond and state municipal bond funds into a single cate-
gory of municipal bond funds. We retain four other
bond fund categories: government bond, corporate
bond, Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA) bond, and high yield bond. We use growth
stock funds as the benchmark stock fund and govern-
ment bond funds as the benchmark bond fund.
To control for the flows’ strong rising trend during
the period, we normalize the flows by dividing them by
the funds’ net asset value in the previous month. Flows are
thus stated as a percentage of a fund category’s net assets.
(The data analyzed in this study are summarized in Table 3.)
Over the period, global stock funds and corporate bond
funds received the largest net flows relative to net assets,
while government bond funds received the smallest. Global
stock funds and GNMA bond funds had the most volatile
net flows, while income stock funds had the most stable
flows. All the flows exhibit high autocorrelations, with
government bond funds and GNMA bond funds showing
the most persistent flows. These autocorrelations imply
that large components of the flows are predictable on the
basis of past flows.
To divide the flows into expected and unexpected
components, we regress flows on three months of lags and
on a time trend (Appendix B).6 The predicted values from
the regressions then serve as our expected flows and the
residuals as our unexpected flows. The expected flows for
growth stock funds and government bond funds reflect a
Sources:  Investment Company Institute; authors’ calculations.
Notes:  Monthly flows into mutual funds over the July 1986–April 1996 period 
are computed as the sum of 1) total sales minus redemptions and 2) exchanges 
into a fund minus exchanges out of a fund. The flow into each group is divided by 
that fund’s net asset value from the previous month. The fund groups are drawn 
from the Investment Company Institute (ICI) classification of mutual funds by 
objective. Some groups combine two ICI categories: growth stock funds includes 
growth and aggressive growth stock funds; global equity funds, global equity and 
international stock funds; income stock funds, equity income and growth-and-
income stock funds; municipal funds, national and state municipal bond funds.
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Growth 118 1.0 1.3 0.34
Global equity 118 1.4 2.2 0.70
Income 118 1.1 0.9 0.69
Bond funds
Government 118 0.4 1.8 0.90
Corporate 118 1.4 1.7 0.75
GNMA 118 0.4 2.2 0.84
High yield 118 1.1 2.0 0.36
Municipal 118 1.1 1.5 0.67
The expected flows . . . reflect a relatively smooth 
and slow process, while the unexpected flows 
show a great deal more short-run volatility. FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997 39
Comparison of Expected and Unexpected Flows
Chart 5
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relatively smooth and slow process, while the unexpected
flows show a great deal more short-run volatility (Chart 5).7
MEASURING MARKET RETURNS
To measure market returns, we select market price indexes
to gauge the performance of the markets in which the
funds in each group invest (Table 4). Within each group,
some funds will do better than others, and flows may shift
to the best performers. However, we are more interested in
the aggregate flows, which depend not on the performance
of specific portfolios but on that of whole market sectors.
In choosing among the various market indexes, it is not
critical that we select precisely the right index because the
various stock market indexes tend to be highly correlated,
as do the bond market indexes.
We compute returns as the changes in the log-
arithms of the end-of-month market indexes and annu-
alize them by multiplying by twelve. As a result, the
annualized return for market i for month t would be given
by Rit = 12 (log Pit - log Pi,t-1), where Pit represents that
market’s index at the end of month t. We then compute
excess returns as the difference between this market return
and the yield on prime thirty-day commercial paper (CP)
in the previous month. The CP rate tracks returns on
money market mutual funds, which are the natural alternative
for an investor not wishing to invest in stock or bond funds.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RETURNS AND FLOWS
In general, net flows into the various mutual fund groups
are highly correlated with market performance (Table 5).
The correlations between net flows and market returns
range from 12 percent for government bond funds to
72 percent for high yield bond funds. In most cases, these
correlations can be attributed almost entirely to the unex-
pected component of net flows. The correlations between
returns and the unexpected components range from 31 per-
cent for GNMA bond funds to 71 percent for growth stock
funds. In Chart 6, we plot these correlations for govern-
ment bond funds and growth stock funds, which serve as
our benchmark bond and stock funds. In contrast, the
correlations between returns and the expected components
of net flows are by and large not statistically different
from zero. These findings are consistent with those of
Warther (1995), who looked at similar flow data cover-
ing the period from January 1984 through December
1992. Combining all the stock funds into one category,
Warther found a correlation of 73 percent between stock
returns and unexpected net flows into stock funds and a
Sources:  DRI/McGraw-Hill; Datastream International Limited; Haver Analytics.
Table 4





Global equity Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (World)
Bond funds 
Government Lehman Brothers Composite Treasury Index
Corporate Merrill Lynch Corporate Master
GNMA Merrill Lynch GNMA Index
High yield Merrill Lynch High Yield Bond Index
Municipal Standard and Poor’s Municipal Index (One Million)40 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997
Correlation between Unexpected Flows
and Market Returns
Chart 6
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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correlation of -10 percent between stock returns and
expected net flows.
CORRELATION VERSUS CAUSATION
High correlations between flows and returns do not neces-
sarily mean that a strong positive-feedback process is at
work. There are at least two ways in which such correla-
tions can arise in the absence of this process. First, a third
factor—such as investor sentiment—may be driving both
flows and returns. An optimistic sentiment may encourage
investment in mutual funds at the same time that it pushes
up asset prices.8 In this case, the resulting correlation
between flows and returns would not imply any kind of
self-sustaining market mechanism. Second, the correlation
may arise from a causal relationship in only one direction:
flows may cause returns but not vice versa. Even when
flows are small relative to the size of the markets, flows
may cause returns if other investors observing the flows
take large positions in the belief that the flows convey use-
ful investment information. The correlation arising from
such one-way causation, however, still does not imply a
positive-feedback process, which requires that the causa-
tion operate in both directions.
DO SHORT-TERM RETURNS CAUSE 
SHORT-TERM FLOWS?
TIMING AND AGGREGATION
Previous studies of causation have typically examined the
effect of returns on current flows into individual funds
over a period longer than a month. For example, Ippolito
(1992), Sirri and Tufano (1993), and Patel, Zeckhauser,
and Hendricks (1994) use annual data to show that inves-
tors shift their money to funds that performed well in the
previous year. For our purposes, however, it is important to
examine effects with lags much shorter than a year and to
examine the flows at an aggregate level. Short lags are nec-
essary for the kind of positive-feedback process that could
lead to a self-sustaining decline. Therefore, we look at the
effects of market returns on flows within a month. This
period is too short for most investors to know precisely
Sources:  Investment Company Institute; authors’ calculations.
Notes:  Monthly flows into mutual funds over the July 1986–April 1996 period 
are computed as the sum of 1) total sales minus redemptions and 2) exchanges 
into a fund minus exchanges out of a fund. The flow into each group is divided by 
that fund’s net asset value from the previous month. The fund groups are drawn 
from the Investment Company Institute (ICI) classification of mutual funds by 
objective. Some groups combine two ICI categories: growth stock funds includes 
growth and aggressive growth stock funds; global equity funds, global equity and 
international stock funds; income stock funds, equity income and growth-and-
income stock funds; municipal funds, national and state municipal bond funds. 
Excess market returns are computed by subtracting the thirty-day commercial 
paper rate from the return index.
Table 5
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MUTUAL FUND FLOWS 
AND EXCESS MARKET RETURNS
Fund Group Total Flow Expected Flow Unexpected Flow
Stock funds
Growth 0.61 0.02 0.71
Income 0.36 0.05 0.49
Global equity 0.31 -0.08 0.55
Bond funds
Government 0.12 -0.07 0.41
Corporate 0.47 0.02 0.68
GNMA 0.21 0.12 0.31
High yield 0.72 0.19 0.70
Municipal 0.48 -0.05 0.69FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997 41
how their own funds have performed relative to other
funds, but they will be able to surmise how the funds,
including their own, have performed on average. At the
same time, shifts in flows from one individual fund to
another that do not change aggregate flows are unlikely to
move prices in the market as a whole. Hence, we measure
the effects of market returns on aggregate flows for funds
within a given investment objective.
THE INSTRUMENTAL-VARIABLE APPROACH
To measure whether returns cause flows, we rely on so-
called instrumental variables. Such variables have not been
used before to analyze causation between mutual fund
flows and market returns. The purpose of these variables is
to isolate a component of returns that we are confident
could not have been caused by flows. We can then estimate
the effect of this component on flows to obtain a measure of
the independent effect of returns on flows. It is therefore
important to identify instrumental variables that are not
only independent of flows, but also relevant to returns.
Specifically, the instruments should be sufficiently corre-
lated with returns to capture a component large enough to
allow a reliable measure of the component’s effect on flows. If
the instruments are weak, some bias will distort the estimates.
With biased estimates, the measured effects will fall some-
where between the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates
and the true effects.
We derive our instrumental-variable estimates in
two stages. First, we regress stock and bond market excess
returns on the instruments. The predicted values from the
first-stage regression then represent a component of returns
that we can consider not to be attributable to mutual fund
flows. Second, we regress mutual fund flows on the pre-
dicted values from the first-stage regression. The coefficients
from the second-stage regression then measure the
independent effect of returns on flows.9
Note that our application of instrumental variables
leaves two issues unaddressed. First, although we can
examine the possible effects of market returns on aggregate
mutual fund flows, we cannot measure the effects in the
opposite direction, because we lack good instrumental vari-
ables for flows. Second, our instrumental-variable analysis
does not allow us to determine the possible effects of longer
term returns on flows, such as those of bull or bear markets
that last longer than two months. Hence, this analysis is
limited to testing a positive-feedback hypothesis based on
causation from only two months of returns.
INSTRUMENTS FOR STOCK AND BOND RETURNS
We use four macroeconomic variables as instruments for
stock and bond excess returns: capacity utilization, the con-
sumer price index, domestic employment, and the Federal
Reserve’s target federal funds rate. We chose these variables
because we may reasonably assume that none are affected
by mutual fund flows in the short run. Moreover, the variables
are significantly correlated with excess stock and bond
returns.10 By their nature, such excess returns would be
hard to predict on the basis of lagged data because stock
and bond markets are so quick to reflect any available
information. Instead of using lagged data for instruments,
however, we use contemporaneous data on macroeconomic
variables—that is, data for the same month over which
we measure returns. The contemporaneous correlations
between the instruments and returns arise because the
stock and bond markets react to the macroeconomic
variables as the information is released. The F-statistics
and Nelson and Startz’s TR2 statistics all suggest that the
instruments have significant explanatory power.11 None-
theless, the coefficients may still be biased because the
first-stage F-statistics tend to be less than 10.12 If the
estimates are biased because of poor instruments, we know
that they will be biased toward the OLS estimates. It will
therefore be useful to compare the instrumental-variable
estimates with the OLS estimates. 
THE EFFECT OF SHORT-TERM RETURNS ON FLOWS
Our instrumental-variable regressions control for changing
volatilities and for conditions in markets other than the
ones in which particular funds invest. (The complete
regressions are reported in Appendix C.) Specifically, each
regression includes as explanatory variables two months of
excess returns and two months of conditional volatilities in
the corresponding market and the same four variables in
the alternative market. For flows into stock funds, the42 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997
alternative market is the government bond market; for
flows into bond funds, it is the market for growth stocks
(Table 4). The same-month returns are modeled using the
instrumental variables, while the lagged-month returns are
not. The conditional volatilities are based on an estimated
process that allows the volatilities to vary over time.13
Warther (1995) runs OLS regressions that include two lags
of monthly returns but not volatilities or returns in other
markets. We find that our specification of explanatory vari-
ables results in stronger estimated effects of short-term
returns on fund flows.14
Our regressions suggest that short-term market
returns have little to no effect on mutual fund flows (Table 6).
In the case of the three stock funds examined, the esti-
mated effect of market returns on flows in the same month
is statistically no different from zero at conventional signif-
icance levels. For the five bond funds examined, the estimated
same-month effect is significant for government bond, cor-
porate bond, and municipal bond funds and is insignificant
for GNMA bond and high yield bond funds. Even when
the effect is statistically significant, however, it is very
small. A market decline of 1 percentage point would lead
to outflows of less than 1/10 of 1 percent of the net assets of
funds of a given type. In most cases, market returns in the
month before have the opposite effect or no effect on flows.
The exceptions are the government bond and GNMA bond
funds, but even here the combined effect of two months of
returns remains small.
Remarkably, our instrumental-variable estimates
also suggest that the funds with the more conservative
investment objectives are also the ones most vulnerable to
outflows.15 That is, the bond funds’ flows are more sensi-
tive to market returns than the stock funds’ flows are.
Among the bond funds, the government, corporate, and
municipal bond funds show larger outflows for a given
market decline than do the GNMA and high yield bond
funds. The largest effect we find involves municipal bond
funds, for which a fall of 1 percentage point in the market
leads to unexpected outflows of 0.084 percent of these
funds’ net assets. For the stock funds, none of the estimated
effects is statistically significant, but the point estimates
suggest that income funds are more subject to outflows than
growth and global stock funds. Investors seem to self-select
in such a way that the more risk-averse ones are also more
sensitive to short-term performance.
POSSIBLE BIASES
To the extent that our instrumental-variable estimates are
still biased, the true effects would serve to strengthen our
conclusions about the relationship between the funds’ flow
reactions and the apparent riskiness of their investment
objectives. Although the standard statistical gauges suggest
that our instruments are adequate, the instruments may
still not be good enough to rule out biased estimates, which
would tend to bring the instrumental-variable estimates closer
to the OLS estimates. Interestingly, our comparison of the
estimates suggests that when the estimated effects are rela-
tively small, the true effects may be smaller still, and when
Source:  Authors’ estimates.
Notes:  The regressions control for excess returns in an alternative market (the 
government bond market for stock funds and the growth stock market for bond 
funds) and for conditional volatility in the markets. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses.  
* Significant at the 90 percent level.
** Significant at the 95 percent level.
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Growth 0.006 0.005 0.013** 0.010**
(1.25) (12.74)
Income 0.016 0.014 0.005** 0.013
(1.68) (2.20)
Global equity 0.010 0.008 0.015** 0.003
(0.92) (6.27)
Bond funds 
Government 0.033** 0.043** 0.015** 0.027**
(2.21) (3.92)
Corporate 0.049** 0.045** 0.041** 0.038**
(3.40) (9.18)
Municipal 0.084** 0.075** 0.053** 0.053
(3.96) (9.08)
GNMA 0.013 0.031** 0.016** 0.042**
(0.71) (2.67)
High yield 0.023 0.016 0.082** 0.065**
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the estimated effects are relatively large, the true effects
may be even larger (Table 6).
Recall that within the class of stock funds or bond
funds, the funds with the riskier investment objectives
show smaller flow reactions than the more conservative
ones. At the same time, the instrumental-variable esti-
mates for the growth and global stock funds are smaller
than the OLS estimates, suggesting that the true effects
may be even smaller than our measures indicate. For the
income stock funds, the instrumental-variable estimates
are larger than the OLS estimates, suggesting that the true
effects may be even larger. For the GNMA and high yield
bond funds, the estimates fall short of the OLS estimates,
suggesting that the true effects may be even smaller, while
the opposite holds true for the government, corporate, and
municipal bond funds.
FEE STRUCTURES AND EFFECTS OF RETURNS 
ON FLOWS
As we noted earlier, the mutual funds’ fee structures may
be one reason for the generally weak effects of short-term
returns on funds’ flows and for the relatively weaker effects
of returns on the more aggressive mutual funds. Although
some fund groups discourage short-run redemptions by
limiting the number of exchanges between funds within a
calendar year, for the most part, funds seem to rely on loads
and redemption fees to discourage fund investors from sell-
ing in the short run. In examining these issues, Ippolito
(1992) finds that poor returns lead to smaller outflows
from load funds than from no-load funds, while Chordia
(1996) finds that aggressive funds are more likely to rely
on these fees to discourage redemptions.
THE EFFECT OF MAJOR MARKET DECLINES
To characterize the effects of market returns on mutual
fund flows, it is important to examine whether large shocks
have special effects. Our instrumental-variable analysis
assumes that the effects on flows are proportional to the
size of the shocks. We now assess this assumption by taking
a closer look at mutual fund flows during five episodes of
unusually severe market declines (Table 7).16 We also look
for evidence that the flows perpetuated the declines. The
market declines were most pronounced in the bond market
in April 1987 and February 1994, in the stock market in
October 1987, in the stock and high yield bond markets in
October 1989, and in the municipal bond market in
November 1994.17 Although these were the markets most
affected, price movements in other markets also tended to
be significant; therefore, we also take these markets into
account. Finally, we examine whether the funds’ invest-
ment managers tended to panic and thus exacerbate the
selling in the markets.
THE BOND MARKET PLUNGE OF APRIL 1987
In the spring of 1987, Japanese institutional investors
pulled out of the U.S. stock and bond markets after the
threat of a trade war between the United States and Japan
precipitated a sharp dollar depreciation (Economist 1987).
In April, government bond prices plunged an average of
2.3 percent, while stock prices and other bond prices also
fell. Taking into account the decline in the government
Mutual funds’ fee structures may be one reason 
for the generally weak effects of short-term 
returns on funds’ flows and for the relatively 
weaker effects of returns on the more
aggressive mutual funds.
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
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Government bond April 1987 2.27 1.23 1.79
Growth stock October 1987 37.67 1.13 4.58
Growth stock October 1989 6.22 0.34 1.44
High yield bond October 1989 1.59 1.34 2.94
Government bond February 1994 2.07 0.85 0.91
Municipal bond November 1994 1.43 1.25 1.4444 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997
bond and stock markets, our instrumental-variable estimates
would have predicted unexpected outflows from govern-
ment bond funds of 1.2 percent of net assets (Table 7).
Actual unexpected outflows were 1.8 percent, much
greater than predicted but still bearing little resemblance
to a run. Although there is some evidence that the flows
served to perpetuate the decline, the magnitudes were still
too small for a self-sustaining decline. In May, the unexpected
outflows from government bonds rose to 2.9 percent of net
assets, while bond prices continued to fall. However, flows
and prices recovered in June.
THE STOCK MARKET BREAK OF OCTOBER 1987
The largest single market decline in our sample was the
stock market break of October 1987. The crash hit growth
stocks the hardest, with prices falling an average of
37.7 percent in the month or about seven times their vola-
tility. The Federal Reserve reacted by announcing a readi-
ness to provide liquidity, and the bond market led a
modest stock market recovery. On the basis of stock and
bond price movements, we would have predicted unex-
pected outflows from growth stock funds of 1.1 percent of
net assets. In fact, unexpected outflows were four times
greater, 4.6 percent. Even so, the outflows were still quite
manageable given the funds’ liquidity levels, which aver-
aged 9.4 percent of net assets. A moderation trend followed
as unexpected outflows from growth stock funds abated in
November and stock prices started to recover in December.
THE STOCK MARKET DECLINE OF OCTOBER 1989
The decline of October 1989 signaled the end of the lever-
aged buyout wave of the 1980s. Previously, stock prices of
many companies had been boosted by premiums reflecting
the possibility of future buyouts at favorable prices.
Although the high yield bond market had been the main
source of financing for the buyouts, it had been weakened
by a series of defaults (Economist 1989). In October, the
management of United Airlines turned to several interna-
tional banks to finance their leveraged takeover of the airline.
The deal failed when some of the banks refused. Many
investors then realized that buyouts would no longer be as
likely as they had thought. Takeover premiums vanished
overnight, and prices of growth stocks fell by 6.2 percent
during the month while those of high yield bonds fell by
1.6 percent. Our estimates would have predicted unexpected
outflows of 0.3 percent of net assets from growth stock
funds and 1.3 percent from high yield bond funds. The
actual unexpected outflows were 1.4 percent and 2.9 percent,
respectively—much greater than predicted but still far
from constituting a run on mutual funds. The funds saw
flows return in November.
THE BOND MARKET DECLINE OF FEBRUARY 1994
In February 1994, the Federal Reserve raised its target federal
funds rate 25 basis points. The increase, the first in a series,
was not altogether a surprise, but prices of government
bonds still fell by about 2.1 percent. Stock prices also fell.
Given these developments, we would have predicted unex-
pected outflows from government bond funds of 0.8 per-
cent of net assets, an estimate that is close to the actual
figure of 0.9 percent. Unexpected outflows rose in March
and bond prices continued to decline, but the magnitudes
remained unimpressive. Prices started to stabilize in April.
THE MARKET DECLINES OF NOVEMBER 1994
In November 1994, the Federal Reserve again raised its
target federal funds rate—this time by 75 basis points, a
larger increase than most investors had anticipated. In
addition, the troubles of the Orange County municipal
investment pool came to light later in the month. Stock
Faced with heavy redemptions and the
possibility that current outflows could lead to 
more outflows in the near future, the fund
managers took the reasonable step of adding
to their liquid balances.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997 45
Market Declines and Mutual Fund Liquidity Ratios
Chart 7
Liquidity as a percentage of net assets


























and bond markets experienced substantial declines, with
municipal bond prices falling by 1.4 percent during the
month. Taking these market movements into account, we
would have predicted unexpected outflows from munici-
pal bond funds of 1.2 percent of net assets, yet actual
unexpected outflows were 1.4 percent. The inflows in
December exceeded the outflows in November.
FUND MANAGERS’ REACTIONS 
Fund managers may react sharply to abrupt market
declines and thus could exacerbate the effects of the out-
flows. For instance, to meet redemptions, they may either
draw on their funds’ liquid balances or sell off portions of
the portfolio. Or they may go further still by selling
more securities than they need to meet the redemptions.
Indeed, in four of the five episodes summarized, average
liquidity ratios rose in the month of the market decline,
indicating that the fund managers sold more than they
needed to meet redemptions (Chart 7). In three episodes, the
liquidity ratio continued to rise in the following month.
Nevertheless, the reactions of fund managers fell well short of
a panic. Faced with heavy redemptions and the possibility
that current outflows could lead to more outflows in the
near future, the fund managers took the reasonable step of
adding to their liquid balances. Moreover, in the five episodes
of market decline, the average liquidity ratio never rose by
more than 2 percent of net assets and never exceeded the high-
est levels reached in periods without major market declines.
CONCLUSION
Can the recent high monthly correlations between
aggregate mutual fund flows and market returns be at
least partially attributed to short-term market returns’
strong effect on flows? If returns have such an effect on
flows and flows also have a strong effect on returns, then
the implied positive-feedback process may lead to a
self-sustaining decline in asset prices. However, our
instrumental-variable analysis suggests that, on average,
the effects of short-term returns on mutual fund flows
have been weak. 
To the extent that the effects of returns on flows
are present, they seem to be stronger for the funds with
relatively conservative investment objectives, such as gov-
ernment bond funds and income stock funds, than for those
with relatively risky objectives, such as growth stock
funds, GNMA bond funds, and high yield bond funds. We
also find that these effects have been stronger in certain
episodes of major market declines, although still not strong
enough to sustain a downward spiral in asset prices.46 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997 APPENDIX
Aggressive growth funds seek maximum capital appreciation;
current dividend income is not a significant factor. Some funds
invest in out-of-the-mainstream stocks, such as those of strug-
gling companies or stocks of companies in new or temporarily
out-of-favor industries. Some may also use specialized investment
techniques, such as option writing or short-term trading.
Balanced funds generally try to achieve moderate long-term
growth of capital, moderate income from dividend and/or
interest payments, and moderate stability in an investor’s
principal. Balanced funds invest in a mixture of stocks, bonds,
and money market instruments.
Corporate bond funds purchase primarily bonds of corpora-
tions based in the United States; they may also invest in other
fixed-income securities, such as U.S. Treasury bonds.
Flexible portfolio funds generally invest in a variety of
securities such as stocks, bonds, or money market instruments.
They seek to capture market opportunities in each of
these asset classes.
Global bond funds seek a high level of interest income by
investing in the debt securities of companies and countries
worldwide, including those of issuers in the United States. 
Global equity funds seek capital appreciation by investing
in securities traded worldwide, including those of issuers in
the United States. 
GNMA funds seek a high level of interest income by investing
primarily in mortgage securities backed by the Government
National Mortgage Association (GNMA).
Growth-and-income stock funds invest mainly in the com-
mon stock of companies that offer potentially increasing value
as well as consistent dividend payments. Such funds attempt
to provide investors with long-term capital growth and a
steady stream of income.
Growth funds invest in the common stock of companies that
offer potentially rising share prices. These funds aim to provide
capital appreciation, rather than steady income.
High yield bond funds seek a high level of interest income
by investing at least two-thirds of their assets in lower rated
corporate bonds (rated Baa or lower by Moody’s and BBB or
lower by Standard and Poor’s). 
Income bond funds seek a high level of income by investing
in a mixture of corporate and government bonds.
Income equity funds seek a high level of income by investing
mainly in stocks of companies with a consistent history of
dividend payments.
Income mixed funds seek a high level of interest and/or
dividend income by investing in income-producing securities,
including equities and debt instruments.
International equity funds seek capital appreciation by
investing in equity securities of companies located outside the
United States (these securities at all times represent two-
thirds of the fund portfolios).
National municipal bond funds (long-term) seek dividend
income by investing primarily in bonds issued by states and
municipalities. 
Precious metal funds seek capital appreciation by investing
at least two-thirds of their fund assets in securities associated
with gold, silver, and other precious metals.
State municipal bond funds (long-term) seek dividend
income by investing primarily in bonds issued by states and
by municipalities of one state. 
Taxable money market mutual funds seek the highest
income consistent with preserving investment principal.
Examples of the securities these funds invest in include U.S.
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Treasury bills, commercial paper of corporations, and large-
denomination bank certificates of deposit.
Tax-exempt money market funds (national) seek the
highest level of federal tax-free dividend income consistent
with preserving investment principal. These funds invest in
short-term municipal securities.
Tax-exempt money market funds (state) seek the highest
level of federal tax-free dividend income consistent with
preserving investment principal. These funds invest primarily
in short-term municipal securities from one state.
U.S. government income funds seek income by investing
in a variety of U.S. government securities, including Treasury
bonds, federally guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, and
other U.S.-government-backed issues.
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APPENDIX B
VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION RESULTS FOR CURRENT MONTHLY MUTUAL FUND FLOWS
Fund Group Constant Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Time Trend Adjusted R-Squared
Stock funds
Growth 0.00082 0.191 0.077 0.230 0.000074 0.26
 (0.38) (2.16)** (0.87) (2.64)** (1.97)*
Global equity -0.00062 0.618 -0.058 0.184 0.000071 0.54
 (-0.22) (6.87)** (-0.56) (2.12)** (1.54)
Income 0.00102 0.465 0.075 0.290 0.0000123 0.54
(0.75) (5.11)** (0.75) (3.23)** (0.71)
Bond funds
Government -0.00024 0.851 -0.130 0.162 0.000001 0.80
 (-0.144) (9.04)** (-1.05) (1.75)* (0.03)
Corporate 0.001805 0.592 -0.039 0.238 0.000009 0.54
(0.74) (6.43)** (-0.37) (2.69)** (0.30)
GNMA -0.00075 0.665 0.114 0.085 0.000010 0.71
(-0.35) (7.27)** (1.03) (1.03) (0.34)
High yield 0.00238 0.249 0.123 0.116 0.000044 0.12
(0.64) (2.63)** (1.27) (1.27) (0.86)
Municipal 0.00460 0.511 0.040 0.131 -0.000029 0.42
(1.78)* (5.43)** (0.39) (1.45) (-0.93)
Source:  Authors’ estimations.
Notes:  Monthly flows into mutual funds over the July 1986–April 1996 period are computed as the sum of 1) total sales minus redemptions and 2) exchanges into a fund 
minus exchanges out of a fund. The flow into each group is divided by that fund’s net asset value from the previous month. The fund groups are drawn from the Investment 
Company Institute (ICI) classification of mutual funds by objective. Some groups combine two ICI categories: growth stock funds includes growth and aggressive growth 
stock funds; global equity funds, global equity and international stock funds; income stock funds, equity income and growth-and-income stock funds; municipal funds, 
national and state municipal bond funds. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 90 percent level.
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APPENDIX C
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSIONS
                              Dependent Variable: Unexpected Flows as a Percentage of Assets
Stock Funds Bond Funds
Independent Variable Growth Income Global Equity Government Corporate Municipal GNMA High Yield
FUNDS’ OWN MARKET
Same-month excess return  0.006 0.016 0.010 0.033** 0.049** 0.084** 0.013 0.023
(1.25) (1.68) (0.92) (2.21) (3.40) (3.96) (0.71) (0.39)
Lagged excess return -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.01* -0.004 -0.009  0.018** -0.007
(-0.67) (1.68) (-0.67) (1.80) (-0.72) (-0.98) (2.57) (-0.45)
Same-month conditional
    volatility -0.081 0.001 0.045 -0.100 -0.005 -0.005 0.030 0.016
(-0.33) (-0.53) (1.23) (-1.64) (0.06) (-0.03) (0.24) (0.45)
Lagged conditional 
    volatility -0.040 0.001 -0.013 -0.001 0.029 0.001 0.084 -0.003
(-0.23) (1.44) (-0.40) (-1.64) (0.35) (0.52) (0.66) (-0.11)
ALTERNATIVE MARKET
Same-month excess return 0.037** -0.008 0.009 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.009
(2.18) (0.83) (0.34) (-0.87) (0.24) (0.21) (0.42) (0.36)
Lagged excess return -0.017** 0.003 0.005 -0.004 -0.004* -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(-2.61) (-1.03) (0.49) (-0.19) (-1.75) (-0.81) (-1.06) (0.38)
Same-month conditional
    volatility -0.042 -0.001  -0.178* 0.341 -0.207 -0.003 0.222 0.068
(-0.62) (-0.37) (-1.67) (1.58) (-0.98) (-1.21) (0.82) (0.11)
Lagged conditional 
    volatility -0.044 -0.000 -0.161*
0.274*
-0.148 -0.002 0.132 0.114
(-0.64) (-0.08) (-1.67) (1.79) (-0.96) (-1.15) (0.67) (0.29)
Adjusted R-squared 0.350 0.050 0.251 -0.070 0.460 0.370 0.180 0.280
F-statistic 3.060 1.170 1.882 3.670 6.350 4.840 2.980 1.740
Source:  Authors’ estimates.
Notes:  The same-month returns are based on the following instruments: capacity utilization, the Federal Reserve’s target federal funds rate, nonfarm employment, and the 
consumer price index. For stock funds, the alternative market is government bond funds. For bond funds, the alternative market is growth funds. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses.
* Significant at the 90 percent level.
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APPENDIX D
REGRESSIONS BASED ON WARTHER’S EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Dependent Variable: Unexpected Flows as a Percentage of Assets
Growth Stock Funds Government Bond Funds
Independent Variable








( 1 )( 2 ) ( 1 )( 2 ) ( 1 )( 2 ) ( 1 )( 2 )
 FUNDS’ OWN MARKET
Same-month excess return 0.012** 0.012** 0.011** 0.011** 0.017** 0.017** 0.029** 0.029**
(11.51) (11.38) (3.73) (3.55) (4.25) (4.27) (3.16) (3.15)
Excess return lagged one month -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 0.012** 0.012** 0.009* 0.010**
(-2.99) (-2.99) (-2.39) (-2.36) (2.88) (2.96) (1.97) (2.11)
Excess return lagged two months -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
(-0.68) (-0.58) (-0.73) (-0.63) (0.14) (-0.01) (0.41) (0.24)
Excess return lagged three months 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 0.004
(-0.43) (-0.51) (0.94) (0.98)
Adjusted R-squared 0.538 0.535 0.534 0.529 0.209 0.208 0.141 0.149
F-statistic 45.240 33.730 5.711 4.474 11.048 8.497 7.972 6.147
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The ordinary least squares regressions use the same explanatory variables as in Warther (1995). The instrumental-variable regressions also use the same variables as 
in Warther, but include instruments for the same-month excess returns. For the instrumental-variable regressions, the same-month returns are based on the following 
instruments: capacity utilization, the Federal Reserve’s target federal funds rate, nonfarm employment, and the consumer price index. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 90 percent level.
** Significant at the 95 percent level.ENDNOTES
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1. The large mutual fund flows have caught the attention of the
financial press. For example, see Economist (1995), Norris (1996), and
Gasparino (1996).
2. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 treats a mutual fund’s
shareholders as investors who directly hold the securities in the fund’s
portfolio. To maintain their status as tax-exempt conduits, the funds
must satisfy certain standards for diversification and sources of income.
3. These statistics were provided by the Investment Company Institute.
They are available upon request from the ICI.
4. Investors may have seen such a market in 1973 and 1974, when the
stock market fell an average of 23.3 percent a year. Mutual funds
apparently saw heavy outflows from 1972 to 1979 (based on an ICI data
series that was discontinued in 1983). In addition, Shiller (1984) cites a
decline in the number of investment clubs from a peak of 14,102 in 1970
to 3,642 in 1980.
5. Although the flow data are available from January 1984 on, our
sample period does not begin until two and a half years later, when full
data on market returns become available.
6. Alternatively, we could have controlled for the time trend at a later
stage of the analysis, but the conclusions would have remained
unchanged. In the analysis, we regress flows on measures of excess
returns. Since these returns are uncorrelated with the time trend,
excluding the trend from this later regression does not result in an
omitted variable bias.
7. Statistically, we can define these unexpected flows as a stationary
process that allows us to draw the appropriate inferences from regression
estimates. More specifically, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reject the
presence of a unit root.
8. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), for example, consider mutual fund
flows and discounts on closed-end funds as measures of investor
sentiment. However, Warther (1995) finds no correlation between such
flows and discounts.
9. For a good textbook treatment of the use of instrumental variables,
see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 622-51).
10. The literature on the effects of macroeconomic variables on the
stock and bond markets is extensive. See Fleming and Remolona
(1997) for a survey.
11. Because of correlation among the instruments, some coefficients in
the first-stage regression are individually not statistically significant. The
significant coefficients have the expected signs (as discussed in Fleming
and Remolona [1997], for example). We did not exclude the
insignificant instruments, however, because our tests showed them to be
jointly significant.
12. See Nelson and Startz (1990), Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1993), and
Staiger and Stock (1994) for discussions of the uses and limitations of
instrumental variables.
13. More specifically, the conditional volatilities are based on an estimated
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) process.
14. We report OLS and instrumental-variable regressions in Appendix D
to show that the extra lag does not contribute explanatory power, while
the volatilities and other-market returns serve to strengthen the
measured short-term effects of own-market returns on flows.
15. Note that the more conservative funds also exhibit less volatile flows.
16. We also tried to test this assumption econometrically by including
variables representing returns that are more than a standard deviation
from either side of the mean. We found that these variables contributed
no significant explanatory power. There were relatively few large shocks,
and their effects were apparently too different to be captured statistically.
We also tried to test the possibility of asymmetric effects by including
variables representing only negative returns. Again, we found that these
variables contributed no significant explanatory power.
17. Marcis, West, and Leonard-Chambers (1995) also look at mutual
fund flows during market disruptions in 1994 and come to conclusions
similar to ours.52 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1997 NOTES
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